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Abstract
It is a common assumption to believe that encouraging pro environmental 
behavior (PEB) in one domain would lead to increased PEB in other domains 
(best-case scenario) or just be restricted to the initial targeted domain 
(worst-case scenario). Evidence from a rapidly growing literature on moral 
licensing suggests that interventions targeting behavioral change could 
lead to an even worse scenario, with individuals starting to underperform 
in one domain, as a compensation for their good performance in other 
domains. We propose to study the dynamic of PEBs when individuals are 
exposed to a specific nudge (priming) via an original experiment designed 
to capture actual behavior. We found that priming could increase PEB, but 
does not thwart moral licensing. Primed individuals end up doing worse 
than non-primed individual under a moral licensing condition. A more 
comprehensive view of the mechanisms underlying behavioral change is 
essential to support sustainable policies.
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In the last several years policy makers have engaged in a range of behavior 
change initiatives aimed at increasing pro environmental behavior (PEB). 
Information campaigns, as well as economic incentives and nudges of vari-
ous types (normative messaging, default option, reminders, etc.), have been 
used to encourage the adoption of more sustainable practices across a range 
of areas (recycling, energy saving, healthier food habits, organ donation), 
with mixed results (for a review of international evidence see Allcott, 2011; 
Al-Ubaydli & Lee, 2011; Southerton et al., 2011; Viscusi et al., 2011). 
Evaluations of the effectiveness of these initiatives are fraught with many 
complex issues, the most prominent of which is that most initiatives evalu-
ate the direct impact that results from the specific initiative adopted (say 
reduced household emissions from energy saving), without addressing the 
effect that the initiative may inadvertently have on other behaviors (Gilg 
et al., 2005).
Recent research on pro-environmental behaviors reveals the importance 
of considering behavioral spillovers, that is, the effects an initial intervention 
may have on subsequent behaviors not directly targeted by it (Poortinga 
et al., 2013). Negative spillovers (i.e., when an increase in one PEB is associ-
ated to a decrease in another unrelated PEB) could be harmful to participants 
if neglected as they could cancel the benefit associated with the initial inter-
vention. While those negative spillovers tend to be associated with the so 
called rebound effect (i.e., expected economic gains from a new technology 
are offset by a change in behavior, such as, replacing one conventional light 
bulb with two LED light bulbs), we focus in this work on a less considered 
type of spillover affecting moral behavior, “Moral licensing”; suggesting a 
high level of complexity in the way individuals make decisions over time. 
“Moral licensing,” the idea that people may off-set their virtuous deeds by 
feeling entitled to behave more self-indulgently afterward, offers new per-
spective to approach PEB and the global impact of policies (Blanken et al., 
2015; Galizzi & Whitmarsh, 2019; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Mazar & Zhong, 
2010; Mullen & Monin, 2016). In light of this theory, an internal balancing 
mechanism between good and bad deeds prevents individuals from reaching 
their long-term goals. Moral licensing has been applied to health (smokers 
taking vitamin pills smoke more cigarettes; Chiou et al., 2011) or even driv-
ing habits (Prius hybrid drivers are more likely to break crosswalk laws, get 
into accidents, and receive fines; Woodyard, 2009) but little is known about 
moral licensing implications within the environmental domain in real life set-
tings (Clot et al., 2016). This present paper proposes to investigate the poten-
tial for “green licensing.”1 A better understanding of how individual behavior 
interferes with environmental long-term goals and to what extent moral 
licensing may harm environmental policies seems crucial in helping to design 
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effective policies: the goal is to reduce carbon footprints overall, and thus any 
negative spillovers must be “planned in.”
Our work relies on an experiment designed to study moral licensing in the 
environmental domain by observing actual behavior. We designed and con-
ducted a between-subjects experiment with one control and two treatments 
that tested the impact of exposure to environmental information (priming via 
green product rating) on the opportunity to actually do good for the environ-
ment in two sequential tasks (signing a petition and recycling).
Background
The implicit expectation of behavior change initiatives is that once an 
individual has become more conscious in one domain, this will spread to 
a whole range of other choices. This rests on two assumptions: (1) that 
having more information about issues and caring about them encourages 
more action, and (2) aside from practical resource constraints (essentially 
time and various forms of capital, including human capital) there is no 
upper limit to the amount of “good” actions that individuals are willing to 
undertake. However, experimental evidence from behavioral economics 
suggests a more complex picture given that, whilst individuals care about 
the effect of their actions on others (social preferences or prosocial behav-
ior), they also experience self-control problems (moral licensing) 
(Blanken et al., 2015; Khan & Dhar, 2006; Mazar & Zhong, 2010; Mullen 
& Monin, 2016).
For instance, the mixed results of carbon-offset programs constitute a 
good example that could find its roots in moral licensing. Major organiza-
tions engaged in releasing carbon off-sets, such as Responsible Travel, 
Yahoo, or the United States House of Representatives have stopped their 
activity because “Offsets are distracting people from making more signifi-
cant behavioural changes, such as flying less” (Rosenthal, 2009). Seventy 
percent of people in the UK believe that air travel has a significant impact on 
climate change (British social attitudes survey, 2009), but only 26% would 
try not flying in the next 12 months (88% would be willing to reduce the 
energy used at home). While an increasing portion of people acknowledge 
that flying is a major source of carbon emission, which goes against their 
environmental values, very few are ready to change their habits in line with 
their green ideals. Relying on 202 individual interviews about sustainable 
lifestyle, Barr et al. (2011) highlighted this contradiction within individual 
lifestyle. Their findings reveal that people having the greener habits at home 
were also those flying the most. People further argue that they deserved such 
flying as a reward for their green efforts. This is a concrete example of paradox 
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linked to moral licensing that may seriously affect the efficiency of pro-envi-
ronmental initiatives.
Moral licensing questions the sustainability of isolated measures target-
ing one specific domain (e.g., waste management, water use, energy con-
sumption, purchase of local or organic food) in achieving a successful path 
to greener lifestyles at an aggregated level. The idea that people may off-
set their effort in one domain by feeling entitled to behave more indul-
gently subsequently through moral licensing is emerging rapidly (see 
Blanken et al., 2015 for a meta study and Mullen & Monin, 2016 for a 
comprehensive review). Looking at driving habits, a study shows that 
Prius hybrid drivers are more likely to break crosswalk laws, get into acci-
dents, and receive fines than drivers from conventional cars (Norton, 
2012). In the environmental domain, voluntary commitment to carbon 
reduction (i.e., buying carbon offsets) could promote the use of polluting 
transportation such as airplanes (Khan et al., 2010). Other studies have 
shown that environmental commitment (i.e., buying green products or 
committing to a conservation program) could alter subsequent behavior by 
decreasing moral attitude but also easing moral transgression (Clot et al., 
2014; Mazar & Zhong, 2010).
The mechanism that leads people to behave consistently or even increase 
their good behaviors in repeated events (positive spillovers) rather than off-
setting them (negative spillovers) remains an open question. The literature 
brings evidence that both positive and negative spillovers (but also no spill-
overs at all) exists, which underlines the need to look more closely at the 
factors and conditions associated to those spillovers.
In a comprehensive interdisciplinary literature review, Truelove et al. 
(2014) highlight three moderators that may play a significant role in spill-
overs: (1) the decision-mode (whether people’s decisions are calculation vs 
affect based), (2) the causal attribution (external or internal), and (3) the 
characteristics of the sequential behaviors (in terms of similarity and diffi-
culty). Consolidating existing work on spillovers, Maki et al. (2019) run a 
metanalysis compiling 25 experimental or quasi-experimental studies 
manipulating spillovers across PEBs, and found positive spillovers on the 
intention to perform a subsequent PEB but negative spillovers when it 
comes to actual behavior. In a more conceptual paper based on a review of 
the literature, Nilsson et al. (2017) propose a distinction over behavioral, 
temporal, and contextual spillovers, discussing theories underlying positive 
spillovers (cognitive dissonance, self-perception, and action-based learn-
ing) as well as those theories underpinning negative spillovers (moral 
licensing and rebound effect). They additionally discuss possible modera-
tors at the task level (similarity) as well as at the personality level (personal 
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preference for consistency) and finally report the determining role played 
by self-identity.
Overall, one dimension that brings together a majority of scholars is the 
way in which the PEB is initiated that is the origin of the motivation that is 
external versus internal. External sources of motivation, such as regulations 
or financial rewards may crowd out intrinsic motivation and further translate 
into negative spillovers. In contrast, when the source of motivation is inter-
nal, the PEB is linked to the individual’s self-identity and crowds-in intrinsic 
motivation, and thus positive spillovers, are more likely to arise (Clot et al., 
2016; Lacasse, 2016; Nilsson et al., 2017; Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009; 
Truelove et al., 2014).
Nudges are becoming a popular tool to promote virtuous behavior by 
influencing socially relevant decisions in desirable ways at a relatively low 
cost, for example, to increase pro-environmental choices or pro-social 
behavior in general. Such nudges seem promising and extraordinarily suc-
cessful when evaluating their impact on the targeted behaviors in isolation. 
In the context of spillovers, the role played by nudges may be ambiguous as 
they could subtly comfort people already doing well, but they could also be 
particularly influential in driving individuals to start acting in a new way. A 
few papers have investigated the interactions between nudges and behav-
ioral spillovers. Sintov et al. (2017) found that nudging with cognitive 
accessibility impact spillovers through an initial relatively difficult behavior 
(composting) while normative messaging does not. Lacasse (2019) investi-
gated the impact of purposefully adopting a new PEB and found that associ-
ating a nudge to the adoption of a new PEB (i.e., tracking that behavior via 
messaging) had small, indirect positive spillover effects on one type of indi-
vidual PEB (purchasing local or organic produce) and on political attitude 
(policy support). Capraro et al. (2019) demonstrated via running sequential 
charity games on AMT that moral nudges (asking subjects to self-report 
“what they think is the morally right thing to do”) led to positive spillovers. 
This work further supports that positive spillovers spread across contexts. 
Finally, the findings of D’Adda et al. (2017) demonstrate that push measures 
(i.e., rebates and minimum donation rule) are more effective than nudges 
(i.e., defaults and social information) in promoting fairness over time and 
positive spillovers.
We propose in this work to investigate the role played by a specific nudge 
known as priming in PEBs spillovers. The priming effect lies in the assump-
tion that behavior can be influenced by subtle related cues. For example, 
Fitzsimons et al. (2008) demonstrated that exposure to the Apple logo 
increased creativity. Similarly, Mazar and Zhong (2010) provided experi-
mental evidence that exposure to green products increase ethical behavior in 
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a subsequent task. However, their experiments have also shown that the pur-
chase of green products has opposite effects and can license asocial and 
unethical behavior. More specifically, Mazar and Zhong (2010) found that 
people buying products from a green store are acting less altruistically than 
people only exposed to a green store, but they are also more likely to cheat. 
There are two concomitant explanations for this outcome. First, it could be 
that one situation enable ones to earn moral credit (in the case of buying 
green products, an individual clearly signal their virtuous deed) while the 
other situation (being primed) does not lead to earning any moral credit.
More specifically, our aim is to test the lasting effect of priming by observ-
ing how primed people behave in two subsequent tasks. As discussed earlier, 
we hypothesize that priming will successfully drive individuals’ behavior in the 
desirable way in the first task, but because they have earnt moral credit in this 
first task, moral licensing will drive less ethical behavior in the second task. 
Because priming aims at influencing individuals in an unconscious way, we 
posit that it is closer to an externally driven change, and that it will lead to nega-
tive spillovers in a subsequent PEB. Our hypotheses are summarized below.
H1: Primed individuals are more likely to perform an initial PEB than 
non-primed individuals.
H2: Primed individuals having earnt moral credit via a first PEB will be 
more subject to moral licensing (negative spillovers) in a second PEB than 
primed individuals who haven’t had the opportunity to earn moral credit 
via a first PEB.
Our contribution is twofold. First we expand the literature on nudges’ 
spillovers by exploring the impact of priming on two sequential tasks. 
Second, we develop an original experimental protocol involving “real” tasks 
(signing a petition and recycling) which enables us to observe actual behavior 
(more likely to generate negative spillovers as in Maki et al., 2019) in a con-
text free of economic incentives. The absence of economic compensation 
allows us to disentangle moral licensing from the rebound effect as the two 
concurrent theories at the origin of negative spillovers (Nilsson et al., 2017). 
The experimental methodology is further discussed in the following section.
Experimental Design and Procedure
Participants and Method
The experiment took place at the University of Reading in the UK during 
spring 2016. We ran two sessions following the exact same protocol. 
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Eighty-five undergraduates in total from the economic department (with an 
average age of 19.5 years and 31.4% female2) participated in this between-
subjects experiment as part of their lecture. They were randomly assigned to 
one out of three conditions. Data was collected using both tablets and papers.
Design
The experimental design (see Table 1) is a modified version of Mazar and 
Zhong (2010) and involves a product rating task and two PEBs (PEB_1: 
signing a petition and PEB_2: recycling). The product rating task could 
take two forms. The first version, with a majority of green products, was 
designed to prime participants to act in an environmentally friendly way, 
while there was a majority of conventional products in the second version, 
which constitutes our control group. PEB_1 (signing a petition) represents 
the licensing task while PEB 2 (recycling) is our outcome variable. Our 
experimental design is thus made of three groups: (1) one “Control” (con-
ventional product rating task: no priming) and two treatments, (2) “Priming” 
(green product rating), and (3) “Priming + Licensing” (green product rating 
and licensing task, PEB_1).
More specifically, in Step 1, participants had to rate products on two 
criteria: (1) the design of the packaging and (2) the informativeness of the 
description. In “Control” (the non- primed group), participants were 
exposed to a list with a majority of conventional products (four conven-
tional products, one green product). In “Priming” and “Priming + Licensing,” 
participants were primed through exposure to a list containing a majority of 
green products (four green products, one conventional product). To mini-
mize the possibility that participants notice a link with the subsequent part 
of the experiment, an additional filler task (consisting of rating a sweet) 
was introduced after the product rating task, Step 2.
Table 1. Experimental Design.
Control
No priming + PEB 2
Priming
Priming + PEB 2
Priming + Licensing
Priming + PEB 1 + PEB 2
Step 1 Product rating (4 
conventional/1 green)
Product rating (4 green/1 conventional)
Step 2 Filler task
Step 3 — — Signing a petition (PEB 1)
Step 4 Record recycling behavior (PEB 2)
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The licensing task (i.e., signing a petition) is introduced at Step 3, for 
“Priming + Licensing” only, and involved having the option to sign a peti-
tion (to tell US congress to support the Paris Climate Agreement3). Signing 
a petition in this experiment aimed at giving participants the option to engage 
in small token forms of support for an environmental cause (Kristofferson 
et al., 2014). In prior experimental works, moral credit tasks have taken the 
form of either declarative statements or economic games with monetary 
consequences. The petition is an interesting way to earn moral credit in the 
context of a moral licensing experiment as it enables individuals to perform 
a real good deed, while clearly disentangling the moral aspect of a good deed 
to its monetary consequences. This further facilitates interpretation as it 
enables us to isolate moral licensing from other possible interpretation such 
as the rebound effect.
Our outcome variable PEB_2 was monitored for all three groups, at Step 
4. The outcome variable is measured through recycling behavior, or whether 
papers administered for the experiment are placed in the general waste bin or 
the recycle bin. The instructions made clear to participants that papers (the 
instructions sheet and a smaller envelope with the sweet, both enclosed in a 
larger envelope) should be placed in bins while leaving the room. The follow-
ing sentence “Please, do not forget to take all the papers with you and throw 
them in the bin when you leave the room!” was mentioned both in the paper 
and in the online instructions (see Supplemental Appendix 24). Each paper 
linked to the survey was numbered, so we could record participant’s recy-
cling behavior by checking bins after the experiment.
In sum, our experimental design involves four steps. This first step 
(product rating task) comprised three groups, as summarized in Table 1: 
“Control,” exposed to conventional products, “Priming,” exposed to green 
products, “Priming + Licensing,” also exposed to green products. In a sec-
ond step, all participants took part in the filler task. Only participants in 
“Priming + Licensing” undertook Step 3, the licensing task (PEB_1). Step 
4 (PEB_2) consisted of recording individual recycling behavior.
Procedure
Before participants entered the room, both the tablet and a big envelop (con-
taining the instructions) were placed on tables, making sure to keep enough 
space between students for privacy purposes. As participants entered the 
room, they were asked to sit in front of a tablet. They were told that they 
would participate in a survey for research, which would consist in rating 
products on a list that would be made available on the tablets and that they 
would have a break at the end of the activity before the lecture started again. 
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Additional details on the instructions and the experimental design are avail-
able in the Appendices.
Results
We collected 85 observations well balanced among the three groups (29 in 
Control, 28 in Priming, and 28 in Priming + Licensing). We categorize the 
recycling outcome into three categories: (1) used the recycle bin, (2) used the 
general waste bin, (3) did not use a bin (some individuals just left the papers 
behind them when leaving the classroom).
Our main findings are summarized below. In Table 2, we present the per-
centage of recycling behavior among our three sub-groups along with two 
different nonparametric tests (Fisher exact test and Pearson χ2 5).
Result 1. Priming tends to increase green behavior. Participants in the prim-
ing treatment were more likely to use the recycle bin than participants in the 
control group (+19.95 points, Fisher exact test = 0.091, Cohen’s d = −0.43). 
They were also less likely to litter the classroom by leaving their paper behind 
(−17.12 points, Fisher exact test = 0.056, Cohen’s d = 0.53).
Result 2. The licensing task dampens the effect of priming and leads to a 
significant decrease in green behavior. Overall, participants in the Prim-
ing + Licensing treatment used the recycling bin significantly less than par-
ticipants in the control group (−26.48 points, Fisher exact test = 0.040, 
Cohen’s d = 0.54) as well as the participants in the Priming treatment alone 
(−46.43 points, Fisher exact test = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.03). They were also 
significantly more likely to litter by not using bins than the control group 
(32.88 points, Fisher exact test = 0.010, Cohen’s d = −0.71) as well as than the 
primed group (50 points, Fisher exact test <0.001, Cohen’s d = −1.3).
Figure 1 compares the distribution of participant’s behavior between treat-
ments and control, illustrating Results 1 and 2.
Table 2. Percentage of Recycling Behavior Among Control and Treatment 





Priming +  





Recycling bin 58.62% 78.57% 32.14% 12.3598 0.002 0.002
General waste 20.69% 17.86% 14.28% 0.4033 0.817 0.936
Not in bins 20.69% 3.57% 53.57% 18.8637 p < .001 p < .001
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Within “Priming + Licensing,” we could track down 50% of participants 
who signed the petition.6 The following paragraphs refine the analysis based 
on this observation.
Result 3. Participants who effectively signed the petition were much less 
likely to use the recycle bin than both the control group (−37.19 points, Fisher 
exact test = 0.022, Cohen’s d = 0.85) and the primed group (−57.14 points, 
Fisher exact test < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.45). They were also far more likely to 
not use bins than the control group (+34.45 points, Fisher exact test = 0.017, 
Cohen’s d = −0.94) as well as more likely than the primed group (+53.57, 
Fisher exact test < 0.001, Cohen’s d = −1.76).
Result 4. Participants for which we could not verify the signature reflect sim-
ilar patterns than those who signed it though the effect is less pronounced. 
They were less likely to use the recycle bin than both the control group 
(−15.76 points, Fisher exact test = 0.434. Cohen’s d = 0.17) and the primed 
group (−35.71 points, Fisher exact test = 0.026, Cohen’s d = 0.63). They were 
also more likely to not use bins than the control group (+29.31 points, Fisher 
Figure 1. Distribution of behavior toward waste between control and treatment 
groups.
Note. Fisher’s exact statistical significance. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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exact test = 0.056, Cohen’s d = −0.47) as well as than the primed group 
(+46.43, Fisher exact test = 0.001, Cohen’s d = −1.19).
Finally, we run an ordered probit (Table 3) with behavior toward waste as 
a dependent variable (1 = recycle bin; 2 = general waste; 3 = non-use of bins) 
as a robustness check of the impact of priming and licensing. We controlled 
for group fixed effects7 as well as sensitivity to green products (an indicator 
we built based on the product’s rating survey capturing the difference between 
green and standard products’ ratings). The probit estimates confirm previous 
results and highlights the statistically significant and positive role of priming 
on recycling behavior along with the negative effect of the licensing task 
dampening the priming effect and worsening recycling behavior.
Overall, results from this experiment suggest that behavioral priming has 
a positive effect on the immediate behavior, but it is not robust to moral 
licensing and could generate negative spillovers. The nature of the interaction 
with social and moral value in this particular context does not enable to pro-
mote consistency.
Conclusions
Our findings suggest that the relationship between information and green 
behavior is not straightforward. Priming (or one-shot exposure to environ-
mental information) leads to higher environmentally friendly behavior in the 
directly associated task, but is not robust to licensing. We extend the literature 
on priming showing a positive effect on the immediate task (as in Mazar & 
Zhong, 2010), although the priming effect may not persist over time. As soon 
as the opportunity to perform an environmentally friendly good deed arises, 
the effect of priming disappears and gives way to licensing.
Table 3. Ordered Probit Estimates—Dependent Variable: Recycling Behavior 
(1 = Recycle Bin; 2 = General Waste; 3 = Non-Use of Bins).
Coef. SE Z p > |z|
Priming −0.608 0.348 −1.74 .081
Priming + Licensing 0.852 0.319 2.67 .008
Sensitivity to green products (average green 
product rating-average standard product rating)
0.152 0.171 0.89 .374
Group fixed effect −0.162 0.167 −0.97 .332
Observations 85  
χ2 20.45  
p 0.0004  
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Those findings underline the importance of alternative tools to promote 
environmentally friendly behavior while calling for extreme care when using 
priming techniques, as they may not prevent counterproductive effects. In 
light of prior works on nudge’s spillovers, it suggests that all nudges should 
not be treated the same and that spillovers may greatly vary among the differ-
ent type of nudges.
Firstly, the origin of the motivation is a key element. Earlier research found 
that external sources of motivation (often referred as regulations or financial 
rewards) are more likely to generate negative spillovers contrary to internal 
source of motivation (Clot et al., 2016; Lacasse, 2016; Nilsson et al., 2017; 
Thøgersen & Crompton, 2009; Truelove et al., 2014). Nudging, and more spe-
cifically priming, may not necessarily be associated with intrinsic motivation 
but may be assimilated to an external motivator, thus susceptible to generate 
negative spillovers, as we find in this work. A more nuanced approach of the 
mechanism behind nudges and how it interacts with motivation seems crucial 
in order to better apprehend subsequent spillovers. Noteworthy, this research 
also underlines the potential role of moral licensing in the occurrence of nega-
tive spillovers when PEB are considered over the long run. Past research has 
mostly reported the presence of positive spillovers versus no spillovers in 
response to nudges (Capraro et al., 2019; D’Adda et al., 2017; Lacasse, 2019; 
Sintov et al., 2017). We find that an even worse scenario might occur, that is 
the rise of negative spillovers due to moral licensing.
We developed an original protocol which enables to control for factors 
that are likely to influence the characteristics of spillovers. We test priming’s 
spillovers in a context where treatments involve “real” tasks rather than arti-
ficial ones (recycling), with participants not knowing this would be part of 
the research, limiting the potential influence of an experimenter demand 
effect, known for influencing individual’s behavior (Zizzo, 2010). An addi-
tional originality of our design is to involve non-monetary tasks, so we are 
able to disentangle moral licensing from the other well studied rebound 
effect. Although those two effects may occur concomitantly, it is important to 
ascertain the respective impact of moral licensing in potentially mitigating 
PEB’s spillovers. At the same time, our design still benefits from a controlled 
environment, facilitating impact measurement.
The main limitation of this work is its sample size, which does not enable 
to offer a clear-cut conclusion on the impact of priming on PEBs spillovers. 
It rather aims at opening the debate by focusing on an understudied nudge. At 
the same time, it comforts earlier works on PEBs spillovers, showing that 
impact needs to be assessed over a less restrictive time frame (and not just on 
the variable of interest) as spillovers, both positive and negative may be at 
play. Another limit stands in the fact we could not track all signatures in 
PEB_1 due to voluntarily leaving participants the anonymity option. 
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Altogether, the significance of results holds, but it would have been interest-
ing to isolate people who may have refused to sign the petition and whether 
moral cleansing takes place in the subsequent task.
Further research is required to assess the contrasting impact of different 
types of nudges over the long run and not just on one given behavior. Some 
nudges may be particularly efficient to achieve one goal, while being more 
prone to off settings than other nudges in subsequent PEBs. As things stand, 
policies to encourage more pro-environmental behavior need to confront the 
possibility that a priori effective solutions could also backfire.
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Notes
1. Moral licensing applied to green behavior
2. These figures come from data at the module level. We did not collect demo-
graphic questions at the questionnaire level to minimize the risk of introducing 
a stereotyping bias or an experimenter demand effect on gender. Demographic 
data comes from module class list instead, knowing there may be a gender dif-
ference in the likelihood of attending.
3. Although citizens worldwide have signed this petition, we purposely selected a 
poll that was somewhat unusual to increase the likelihood that participants had 
never previously engaged in such task.
4. Appendices are available online.
5. Pearson χ2 is recommended when comparing association among categorical 
data. The Fisher’s exact test complement the analysis as it is more reliable with 
a small sample size.
6. The time and location indicated on the petition website was coinciding with half 
of our “Priming + Licensing” participants. Because it was possible to sign the peti-
tion anonymously (no name, no country of origin), we lost track for the other half.
7. As data was collected via two different groups
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